This is an extract from a recent report “Energy transition policies in southeast Asia and China: scoping out the ‘just’ aspect” by the Stockholm Environment Institute. The report first develops an 18-indicator framework of what elements could be considered “just” on energy transition pathways. Those indicators were grouped into the categories of: labour justice, energy justice, environmental justice, procedural justice, recognition justice, restorative justice, distributional justice and structural reform. Then uses an AI-powered language model to analyse eight to 10 randomly selected energy and development policies in various countries including China. The main research question here was to see if and how well those 18 indicators were reflected in selected policies. Using summaries provided by the AI tool, it then qualitatively analysed the results and scored the policies based on how well they accounted for justice indicators. This extract specifically focuses on China.

In the past decade, China has accelerated its energy transition significantly. China has added more than 1000 GW of renewable capacity between 2014 and 2023, representing a jump of over 250% in its national renewable energy capacity and accounting for one-third of global investment in clean energy in 2023. However, in terms of reflecting justice in policy sample, this cutting-edge role is missing. Besides limited sample size, it was also the policies’ wording that left many aspects of justice ambiguous. For instance, when it comes to labour justice, the 10 identified policies do not outline specific actions addressing potential unemployment provisions for workers laid off in traditional fossil fuel industries during energy transitions. As mentioned, 10 policies are not enough to fully assess labour justice provisions, especially since subnational policies might be more advanced than national ones. 

Analysed policies did not contain compensatory measures or support for workers and communities affected by the shutdown of power plants or mining operations. This might need addressing, as anecdotal evidence suggests that layoffs in China’s coal industry have lacked adequate compensation and job assistance, particularly in non-state-owned mines. Similarly, while some actions are aimed at reskilling and capacity building, they primarily focus on enhancing the skills of government officials to better oversee energy efficiency and emission reduction efforts, or on students and businesses to foster innovation and prepare the future workforce for the energy transition. Analysed Chinese policies acknowledge the potential of energy transitions to create green jobs, as described in China’s NDC that aims to “promote green and low-carbon industries such as renewable energy vehicles, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and environmental protection to become pillar industries, and vigorously promote the rapid development of strategic emerging industries such as information technology and high-end equipment”.

When it comes to energy justice, China achieved 100% electricity access in 2013 and policies in sample focus more on actions to improve the quality of electricity service in remote regions and on clean heating solutions in northern China through renewable energy sources. In terms of affordability of energy and electricity, China’s policies focus on reducing heating expenses through financial support to reduce the coal price and retrofitting buildings to improve heating efficiency. The focus is reinforced in the 14th Five-Year Plan: Modern Energy System Planning (2021–2025), which aims to “implement policies related to clean heating, including electricity prices, gas prices, and heating prices”. Beyond this, China has not outlined many specific actions targeting energy poverty or affordability in analysed policies. This might be explained partly by its relatively low electricity prices, which are centrally set at USD 0.075/kWh – less than half the global average of around USD 0.152/kWh.

China’s performance when it comes to environmental justice – more specifically the environmental protection indicator – shows that the country sometimes acknowledges the need to protect its environment on transition pathways, but the policies in sample lack clarity and specificity. China tends to subsume environmental protection under general climate change mitigation, biodiversity or conservation measures, as described in the NDC that aspires to “comprehensively plan the synergy, innovation, and integration of climate change response and environmental pollution prevention and control, and biodiversity conservation in the areas of planning objectives, policies and actions, institutional systems, and pilot demonstrations”

But clear environmental protection provisions when it comes to developing clean energy projects are rarely found in analysed policies. One exception is the Chinese conservationist “red-line policy”, which contains multiple provisions designed to “protect those ecologically important areas that have the functions of maintaining important biodiversity, preventing wind, fixing sand, etc.” However,  the policy sample did not contain any of those “red-line” policies, so the analysis was unable to verify the extent of such environmental protection. In terms of land rights, while analysed policies contain provisions to compensate people who “move away” from land that will be repurposed for infrastructure development, “no requisition of land shall be regarded as legal until land compensation fees and settlement allowances have and necessary arrangements have been made for the residents who moved away”.

As far as procedural justice is concerned, while no concrete measure or action to facilitate meaningful multi-stakeholder dialogue within the 10 policies were found, some acknowledgment of the need to bring in a variety of stakeholders into the energy transition decision-making process was found. For instance, China’s Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy calls for building “a climate governance system led by the government, with enterprises as the main body and the participation of social organizations and the public”. Similarly, the 14th Five-Year Plan: Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction (2021– 2025) emphasizes the importance of public participation in encouraging behavior change and adopting energy-efficient lifestyles. 

However, despite this, the public’s role remains limited to participation, or following the policy, rather than decision-making. This tracks with the unique dynamics in Chinese politics, where open and free dialogue between political structures and the wider population is more limited compared to other countries in sample. The same is true for the private sector, which is seen more as an innovator and implementer rather than a decision-maker, as stated in the Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy. Regarding stakeholder feedback, China acknowledges the importance of addressing “public complaints”, but the mechanism for collecting and responding to feedback remains undefined and almost no policy mentions this need for feedback. 

Similarly, provisions for recognition of justice are less well represented in analysed policies, with the exception of recognizing local communities’ needs, which scored better than other indicators. Indeed, gender equity or the need to reflect a variety of visions in energy transition pathways and actions are rarely mentioned. The absence of gender equality concerns is particularly striking. In terms of recognizing the needs of local communities, this indicator was better reflected in analysed policies, but with the particular angle of rural development, where China focuses on renewable energy deployment in rural areas as laid out in the Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014–2020) or the 14th Five-Year Plan: Modern Energy System Planning (2021–2025).

While renewable energy provision in rural areas is framed as part of poverty alleviation and rural revitalization – such as in Sichuan province, where 70 solar PV power stations are connected to the grid, supporting over 3500 low-income households and creating thousands of jobs – sample policies lack clear measures for targeting and supporting local communities more broadly and don’t necessarily acknowledge their needs.

As far as restorative justice is concerned, China recognizes the synergy between energy development and ecological governance in its 14th Five-Year Plan: Modern Energy System Planning (2021–2025), outlining actions such as “shutting down highly polluting mining areas to promote the development of wind power, photovoltaic power generation, ecological carbon sinks, and other industries. However, none of the analysed policies contained explicit provisions to restore or rehabilitate former mining sites, regardless of whether they are repurposed for renewable energy development. Despite the small sample, and the fact that those provisions might be accounted for in other policies, this is noteworthy given the scale of some Chinese coal mines. Similarly, distributional justice is not well reflected in policy sample. However, some actions in the policies could indirectly promote distributional justice. For example, in the development of hydrogen power, China supports the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), stating: “Small and medium-sized enterprises participate in the research and development of key common technologies in the hydrogen energy industry, cultivate a batch of single-champion enterprises with strong independent innovation capability, and promote the synergistic innovation and integrated development of large, medium and small enterprises”. This could help distribute benefits more equitably, especially since China’s energy markets are typically dominated by state-owned enterprises or large corporations. By encouraging the involvement of SMEs, there is potential for more inclusive economic opportunities and more equitable benefit-sharing in the energy sector.

Lastly, structural reform provisions are better reflected in the policy sample, particularly market reform actions. As mentioned above, community energy is framed under the rural electrification angle and rather top-down in nature, suggesting that energy development will primarily be driven by government initiatives rather than emerging organically from local communities. This creates ambiguity regarding the role of communities in driving or participating in their own energy development. China’s energy market reforms aim to boost competition and attract private investment. For example, China plans to move towards more market-based electricity pricing, which is intended to make the energy system more efficient by reflecting the true cost of energy. Another key strategy involves promoting medium- and long-term energy trading through power purchase agreements to ensure a stable electricity supply and price. Additionally, policies encourage demand-side management services and renewable energy certificate trading, thereby enhancing market flexibility. 

China is also fostering market-based trading of distributed power generation within its Modern Energy System Planning framework. In the analysed policies, China promotes energy storage service providers to participate in electricity markets, with a particular focus on hydrogen power storage. However, the specific support mechanisms for their marketization remain undefined. Additionally, those provisions might favor more established companies that can better navigate the complex bureaucratic systems still governing the energy sector, which could disadvantage smaller players and local consumers. Like many other investigated countries, China scores better on some policies and indicators than on others. However, none of the policies surpassed the 50% threshold of the maximum possible score of 36. Despite the limitations, it is noteworthy that China appears more advanced in scaling renewable energies than in reflecting the just elements of this transition in policy. Of particular concern is the low score on environmental and restorative justice (RS), given the large scale of China’s fossil fuel production activities. Also, the low score for labour justice stands out, since energy transitions do need new workforce skills and a dynamic labour market to respond to the energy system’s transformation. 

Access the report here