This is an extract from a recent report “Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports” by European Commission.

The dependency on Russian energy imports leads to serious security and economic risks for the Union and its Member States, as Russia has continuously used existing energy supply as a weapon to threaten the stability and prosperity of the Union. This Roadmap outlines the EU’s strategy to phase out remaining Russian energy imports. It also sets out a common vision of Europe working together in solidarity to ensure alternative and affordable energy supplies for all Member States, while undertaking joint action to reduce Russian revenues, which fuel its war machine and endangers stability of the continent. Reducing dependency on fossil fuels will further strengthen EU energy security and sovereignty in line with EU climate neutrality objective.

Actions undertaken to reduce dependency from Russian energy

The EU has already significantly reduced dependencies and energy imports from Russia, thanks to 16 sanction packages. Sanctions have effectively banned Russian coal and oil imports to the EU and prohibited the reloading of cargoes in EU ports carrying LNG from Russia. Particular attention should be brought to the issue of circumventing the EU oil sanctions by using “shadow fleets”. The implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has also significantly contributed to reducing gas demand. The full implementation of the energy transition and the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy are expected to replace up to 100 bcm of natural gas by 2030. This corresponds to saving the EU more than 15 bcm of gas per year, or a further reduction in gas demand by 40-50 bcm by 2027, which will also facilitate the phase out of Russian gas imports.

As a result of coordinated action between the Commission and Member States, and the enhanced EU energy diplomacy with international partners, gas imports (both LNG and pipeline) from Russia have decreased from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024. These imports have been replaced by supplies from more reliable sources, domestically produced energy and were possible through reduced consumption. Projections point to a further fall to 13% in 2025 with the end of the Ukraine transit. The share of Russian oil imports has also shrunk from 27% at the beginning of 2022 to 3% now. Despite significant progress, Russian gas, oil, and nuclear supplies remain part of the EU’s energy mix, posing risks to our economic security and allowing financial support to Russian war economy.

Need for action

Dependencies on Russian gas imports

Russia has repeatedly threatened the EU’s security of supply by unilaterally cutting gas flows to its European customers in 2006, 2009, 2014 and more recently in 2022 after its aggression against Ukraine, as well as in the run-up to the invasion. Phasing out Russian gas imports is therefore critical to bolster the EU’s energy security against weaponisation of energy imports. It would also reduce Russia’s revenues used to finance the unjustified war against Ukraine and to continue its military build-up. Between 2021 and 2023, the EU reduced Russian gas imports by over 70%, from 150 bcm to 43 bcm. In 2024 this downward trend stopped and imports from Russia increased. LNG imports grew by 12% compared to 2023, from 18 bcm to 20 bcm and pipeline by 26% from 25 bcm to 32 bcm.

Several Member States have taken early actions to reduce or even ban Russian gas imports, including by terminating existing contracts with Russian gas suppliers. However, even after the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in 2025, Russian gas still represents around 13% of the EU’s overall gas imports. Currently, around two thirds of Russian gas imports are supplied based on long-term contracts, with EU destination, while around one third is provided on spot (short-term) basis. Remaining volumes are not expected to be eliminated without further European action given the absence of commercial incentives and ongoing long-term contracts.

Action at EU level is needed to phase out those gas supplies and at the same time ensure alternative supplies from international partners via LNG or pipeline gas, without creating new dependencies. In this context it will be important that infrastructure capacity booked on a long-term basis for Russian imports is made available to imports of gas from alternative sources. The EU has already significantly supported diversification efforts with EUR 184.7 billion to energy-related initiatives under the national Recovery and Resilience Plans and Connecting Europe Facility-Energy (CEF) with EUR 5.84 billion (2021-2027) financing cross-border infrastructure and EUR 55 billion with budget from EU cohesion policy.

Dependencies on Russia in the nuclear sector

In contrast to dependencies in the gas sector, dependencies in the nuclear sector are multifacetted. Russia supplies products and services to EU customers across the whole nuclear fuel cycle. The dependency is most significant in the five Member States with Russian-designed reactors, also known as VVER, reliant traditionally on fuel from a Russian supplier. Likewise, other Member States have been relying on Russia for nuclear materials, spare parts or nuclear fuel cycle services. Russia also holds a strong position in the supply of certain radioisotopes for medical procedures.

Replacing Russian nuclear fuels with alternative suppliers in five Member States with Russian-designed nuclear reactors: Progress has been made in replacing Russian nuclear fuel with fuel from other producers in the five Member States with Russian-designed VVER reactors. Utilities in four out of five Member States concerned have since 2022 signed supply contracts for alternative fuel. The development of alternative nuclear fuels for VVER reactors and their licensing need to be accelerated and contracting with alternative suppliers should progress quickly towards a complete replacement of Russian supplies.

Diversifying supplies and building alternative capacity in nuclear fuel cycle for all Member States with nuclear installations: While more than 14% of uranium was sourced in the EU from Russia in 2024, the global market in natural and processed uranium is rather diversified. A major hurdle is the concentration of uranium conversion and enrichment services – needed to transform processed uranium into the material for nuclear fuel manufacturing – in a limited number of companies. Those located in the EU or other Western countries are currently not able to meet overall demand due to limited capacity of conversion and enrichment plants in operation.

While European enrichment companies have announced plans to extend their current enrichment capacity, the first new enrichment installation is not expected earlier than 2027. Moreover, the global uranium conversion industry is facing obstacles in ramping up production due to technological complexity and market uncertainties, and new conversion capacities are currently announced only for early 2030s. The EU’s nuclear sector also continues to rely on Russia for some spare parts and maintenance services. Continued international cooperation such as that in the G7 context is essential for ensuring sufficient enrichment and conversion capacity as well as spare parts and services in the years to come.

Dependencies on Russia in the oil sector

In 2022, Russian crude oil accounted for 27% of EU crude oil imports while now it only accounts for 3%. This is a direct consequence of the introduction and effective enforcement of EU sanctions, which banned Russian seaborne imports of crude oil from December 2022 and refined petroleum products from February 2023.

With the completion of the TAL-PLUS project in April 2025, Czechia is now able to replace its Russian oil supplies with alternative sources. For Slovakia and Hungary on the other hand, Russian oil represents over 80% of their total oil imports. This high dependency can pose a risk for their security of supply. The Commission continues supporting these Member States to progressively replace Russian oil and ensure alternative suppliers through the Adria pipeline. Further work and actions would be necessary to disrupt and deter Russia’s shadow fleet while enhancing environmental protection, maritime safety and security, and reduce funding for Russia’s war economy.

Actions to phase out energy imports from Russia

Pipeline gas and LNG

Action 1: Transparency, monitoring and traceability

Transparency, monitoring and traceability are the necessary starting point for action to effectively phase out Russian gas and to ensure enforcement. While some Member States have national rules regarding traceability of Russian gas in place, there is no coherent EU framework on transparency, monitoring and traceability of Russian gas imports to the EU.

Therefore, the Commission will propose measures necessary for more effective monitoring and traceability. One measure would require companies to provide information on Russian gas contracts (e.g. volumes, duration) to Member States’ relevant authorities and to the Commission. Another action would ensure that information on actual imports of Russian gas is shared among customs, national energy and security authorities, and the Commission.

Action 2: National plans to support EU action to phase out Russian gas

National plans should, inter alia, lay out:

  • The volume of Russian gas imports under existing contracts, including for contracts with take-or-pay clauses
  • A timeline, including milestones supporting EU measures to achieve the objective of phasing out Russian gas
  • Diversification options and technical capabilities to replace Russian gas, including through cooperation in existing regional groups.

The Commission will support Member States in the preparation of the plans, through established working and coordination groups, such as the Gas Coordination Group, or a dedicated subgroup as well as regional groups.

Action 3: Stepwise prohibition of Russian gas imports

Provided the phase out is gradual and alternative supplies are ensured, the prohibition of Russian gas imports is expected to have a limited impact on prices and on security of supply in Member States. Around two thirds of the Russian LNG and pipeline gas imports are based on existing long-term contracts with EU destination. The remaining volumes are supplied on short-term (spot) basis, with importers deciding on purchases based on their needs and prevailing market conditions. With longer contract duration and higher volumes in the existing long-term contacts than the volumes typically purchased in spot supply contracts, it is appropriate to organise the phase out of Russian gas imports in two steps, starting immediately with all new contracts and existing spot (short-term) contracts.

A phased approach to eliminating Russian gas imports would allow markets to better adjust and minimise market impact and potential implications for security of supply. The Commission will ensure that the measures to eliminate Russian gas imports will be designed in a manner that minimises economic impact on market actors and is in full compliance with EU law and obligations under international law.

  • Prohibition of imports under new contracts and existing spot contracts on Russian gas
  • Prohibition of imports of Russian gas under existing long-term contracts

Action 4: Supporting diversification by demand aggregation and better use of infrastructure

Securing alternative supplies from reliable partners is critical to limiting any market or security of supply impact. In parallel, alternatives to natural gas imports should continue to be developed where possible, notably via electrification or boosting the production of biogas and biomethane and clean hydrogen in line with REPowerEU. During the crisis, AggregateEU has proven to be an effective tool contributing to the REPowerEU objectives by supporting European consumers and companies in procuring non Russian gas.

Looking forward, options going beyond demand aggregation should be also explored in view of harnessing EU purchasing power to support its diversification efforts. Based on the experience of AggregateEU, the Commission is evaluating the feasibility of a platform to support the scale-up and trade of gaseous molecules of non-fossil origin, including biomethane. In addition, the Commission is working with the industry and other stakeholders to advance the deployment of sustainable biogas and biomethane.

Nuclear

Action 5: New restrictions to phase out Russian imports of uranium, enriched uranium and other nuclear materials

  • Measures on enriched uranium: The Commission will seek to make Russian imports of enriched uranium economically less viable by presenting, next month, trade measures on the import of enriched uranium.
  • Restrictions on contracts co-signed by the Euratom Supply Agency: Next month the Commission intends also to restrict new supply contracts co-signed by the Euratom Supply Agency for uranium, enriched uranium and other nuclear materials with Russian suppliers as of a certain date.

Action 6: Diversification obligation and transparency: national plans to phase out Russian nuclear supplies

Member States will be required to develop national plans with concrete actions and timelines, and recommends that Member States already submit their first national plans by the end of 2025, aiming to provide reassurance and predictability to economic actors when taking investment decisions to make available sufficient uranium conversion and enrichment capacity. Concretely, the Commission intends to propose, next month, a legislative proposal with specific targets for Member States to:

  • Replace Russian nuclear fuels with alternative fuels by accelerating the contracting and licensing of such fuels and developing further fully European alternatives.
  • Phase out reliance on Russia for uranium, enriched uranium and other nuclear materials.
  • Increase transparency on dependencies and encourage diversification of Russian supplies of spare parts and maintenance services.

Action 7: Ramping-up EU production: Proposal for a European Radioisotopes Valley Initiative (ERVI)

The Commission intends to propose the creation of an EU structure – a European Radioisotopes Valley – to secure EU supply of medical radioisotopes through increased own production, reduce EU dependency on foreign suppliers, in particular Russia, and increase the resilience of the European supply chain, taking into account different needs of Member States.

Oil

Action 8: National plans to phase out Russian oil and ensure alternative supplies

In line with the proposal for the preparation of national plans to phase out Russian gas, the Commission recommends that the two concerned Member States plan and monitor the phase out of oil imports from Russia. Sufficient infrastructure is available to replace such oil imports with non-Russian supply. Therefore, the Commission intends to propose an obligation requiring those Member States to establish such plan and its monitoring. Member States concerned would be required to draft and submit to the Commission national plans outlining their strategies for replacing Russian oil imports by the end of 2027.

Such plans could be included as a chapter in the national plans to phase out Russian gas. Existing working and coordination groups, such as the Oil Coordination Group or dedicated subgroups, and regional groups will ensure coordination and support. The Commission encourages affected Member States to prioritise alternative supply infrastructure when available. The Commission intends to present the legislative proposal next month on national plans to phase out remaining Russian oil imports and recommends that concerned Member States already submit their first national plans in by the end of 2025.

Action 9: Continue imposing and enforcing sanctions on entities and vessels suspected of illicit activities

To address the problem of circumvention of EU oil sanctions by using “shadow fleets”, the following actions are envisaged:

  • Continue outreach and dialogue with concerned third countries.
  • Work with international partners, including with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to establish and uphold stringent maritime safety and security standards.
  • Encourage Member States to enhance maritime surveillance, building on the integrated services hosted in the European Maritime Safety Agency.
  • High Representative will explore with the Member States the deployment of an EU Common Security and Defence Policy mission.
  • Enforcing international maritime law, including through requesting the Flag State of a suspicious vessel, or its master, that the vessel enters the territorial sea of a State, where that coastal State may take all necessary measures in accordance with UNCLOS and its domestic law.
  • Boarding and inspecting vessels of interest in the high seas or in the exclusive economic zones of the EU Member States, where allowed under UNCLOS or after obtaining the consent of the Flag State to that effect.
  • Conclude agreements with concerned Flag States to secure their consent for preauthorized boarding operations on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zones of EU Member States.

Conclusion

This Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports aims at ensuring the EU’s independence from Russian energy by gradual phasing out imports of gas, nuclear, and oil in an orderly, secure and well-prepared manner in line with EU climate neutrality objective. It complements the EU’s strategic goals, as set out in the Competitiveness Compass for the EU, the Clean Industrial Deal and the Action Plan for Affordable Energy by reducing imports of fossil fuels from suppliers that create economic security concerns and accelerating the clean transition, moving away from fossil fuels. The nine proposed measures in this Roadmap will effectively remove Russian energy from EU markets, without jeopardising security of supply while minimising the impact on prices and markets. Delivering on the Roadmap will require strong commitment, solidarity, engagement and cooperation of all Member States, EU institutions and energy market actors.

Access the report here