The paper “Securing Critical Minerals at Scale: Multilateral Solutions for Energy, Defense, and Semiconductor Supply Chains” has been authored by Jeffrey D. Bean and Dhruva Jaishankar of ORF America. This paper assesses growing demands for these minerals — minus the platinum group — and the risk of disruption, as well as the prospects for international collaboration to address the shortfall among the United States, European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia.
Key highlights from the paper:
The United States is over 75 percent import dependent on twelve critical minerals in addition to rare earth elements. For national security, energy security, and sustainability, and for basic growth and prosperity in an era of digital economies, cooperation in diversifying and strengthening critical mineral supply chains will be necessary.
Numerous countries have developed critical minerals lists. These lists greatly overlap but are rarely identical because vulnerabilities and demand are unique to each country’s geology, capacity, and requirements. The United States 2025 List of Critical Minerals, developed by the U.S. Geological Survey, includes sixty minerals, up from fifty in 2022. Unlike many other countries, the United States does not group heavy and light rare earth elements (REEs) or Platinum Group metals, resulting in larger lists.
De-risking critical mineral supply chains will require cooperation among a variety of actors, including U.S. allies and partners and between the developed and developing worlds. Following the completion of the Section 232 investigation on critical minerals in October 2025, U.S. president Donald Trump directed the U.S. government to continue the process of addressing the critical minerals deficit with international partners through various authorities, tools, and relationships, including new partnerships. These partnerships include three main U.S. government-led efforts: Pax Silica, the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE), and Project Vault. In addition, critical mineral coordination is underway among the Group of Seven Plus and Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) groupings.
While a host of bilateral MoUs have been signed by the United States and its partners on critical minerals, attempts at true multilateral or minilateral cooperation are nascent, while public-private efforts remain challenging. Two areas for further research and investigation present themselves. First, how can the United States and its partners and allies effectively coordinate new initiatives and industrial policies tied to critical minerals in the midst of a scramble for self-sufficiency to avoid self-defeating competition? Second, what are the implications for the future global trading order if greater levels of customs union-style coordination are sought to redress imbalances in critical materials through price floors?
Access the paper here